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Abstract: Whether an economic agent’s decision creates an externality of-
ten depends on the institutional context in which the decision was made.
Indeed, in orthodox economics, a technological or exogenous externality oc-
curs just in case one agent’s economic welfare or production possibilities are
directly affected by the market decisions of other agents. A pecuniary ex-
ternality occurs just in case one consumer’s economic welfare or producer’s
profit is affected indirectly by price changes caused by changes in other
agents’ decisions. Similarly, an institutional or endogenous externality may
arise whenever allocations are determined by a mechanism that is not strat-
egyproof for some agent. Then even a resource balance constraint creates
an institutional externality except in special cases such as when no indi-
vidual agent’s action can affect market clearing prices — i.e., there are no
pecuniary externalities.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Hurwicz on Mechanism Design
Much of Leo Hurwicz’s long and distinguished career was devoted toward
discovering how market and other economic institutions could be designed
in order to improve the effect of individual agents’ economic decisions on
the well-being of society.
Leo’s early work on this topic appeared as Hurwicz (1960, 1972), much
of which was synthesized in Hurwicz (1986). Late enough in his life for him
to have been invited to deliver the Richard T. Ely Lecture to the Ameri-
can Economic Association, Hurwicz (1973) did a great deal to promote the
systematic exploration of incentive compatible allocation mechanisms for
resource allocation. This was very useful to me when working on Ham-
mond (1979), especially the typical incentive incompatibility of lump-sum
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redistribution of the kind needed to support typical first-best Pareto effi-
cient allocations. This and the earlier articles by Hurwicz were a source of
inspiration for many of the other contributions to the Review of Economic
Studies “Symposium on Incentive Compatibility” that I edited, including
inter alia Hurwicz (1979) and Dasgupta et al. (1979).1
1.2 Hurwicz on Institutions and Externalities
Several years later Leo Hurwicz (1995, 1999) wrote specifically about exter-
nalities, including the Coase theorem. In Hurwicz (1996) he wrote about
“institutions as families of game forms”, and in Hurwicz (1998) on “the de-
sign of mechanisms and institutions”, which appeared in a volume with the
title “designing institutions for environmental and resource management.”
In his Nobel Memorial Prize lecture, Hurwicz (2008), he revisited this idea
of the link between institutions and game forms.
I take this background as inspiration for using this opportunity to write
about externalities and mechanism design, though from a perspective that
is no doubt very different.
1.3 Outline
The purpose of this paper is to relate different concepts of externality to the
economic institutions which determine, or at least influence, what outcome
to the participating agents emerges.
As argued in Section 2, classical externalities come about as a departure
from the standard “neoclassical” institutional framework, with complete and
perfectly competitive markets for private goods.
Next, Section 3 considers pecuniary externalities. As Laffont (2008)
correctly observes, unlike classical externalities, they do nothing to upset the
usual efficiency properties of equilibrium allocations in competitive markets.
They do, however, have a significant influence on gains from trade results.
Section 4 introduces the concept of an institutional externality. Like clas-
sical and pecuniary externalities, it captures the idea that one agent’s actions
1A confession may be in order. As the deadline for sending the papers for the sympo-
sium to the production editor loomed, there was only a still incomplete version of Leo’s
contribution sitting on my editorial desk. In particular, there was no introduction, though
fortunately a first footnote provided most of what was needed. So, in an era when even
transatlantic phone calls remained rare and expensive, Leo’s paper appeared without his
formal approval of this last minute change. I have heard that Leo, as one might have
expected, was amused rather than offended by this course of action.
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can influence the possibilities open to other agents. With institutional ex-
ternalities, however, the influence is more subtle. The idea is that, except
when the institution can be modelled as a game form in which agents can
choose dominant strategies, one agent’s strategy choice can influence what
other agents will want to choose. This is what we call an “institutional
externality”.
Hurwicz, of course, demonstrated that such strategy-proof mechanisms
fail to exist in many economic environments. In this sense, institutional ex-
ternalities are endemic. Nevertheless, Section 4 concludes with some promi-
nent examples of economic environments in which institutional externalities
can be avoided.
The final Section 5 attempts to put these results in a general perspective.
2 Classical Externalities as Constraints
2.1 Defining Classical Externalities
In what has become the standard textbook for graduate courses in microe-
conomic theory, Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, p. 351) write:
Surprisingly, perhaps, a fully satisfying definition of an external-
ity has proved somewhat elusive.
As a “serviceable departure,” they offer this as a definition:
An externality is present whenever the well-being of a consumer
or the production possibilities of a firm are directly affected by
the actions of another agent in the economy.
They also offer this additional “subtle point”:
When we say “directly,” we mean to exclude any effects that are
mediated by prices.
This use of the key word “directly” contrasts markedly with the word
“indirect” that is used in the definition provided at the head of Laffont’s
(2008) entry in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics:
Externalities are indirect effects of consumption or production
activity, that is, effects on agents other than the originator of
such activity which do not work through the price system.
In a private competitive economy, equilibria will not be in general
Pareto optimal since they will reflect only private (direct) effects
and not social (direct plus indirect) effects of economic activity.
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2.2 Externalities and Constrained Efficiency
Laffont (2008) goes on to write:
In a private competitive economy, equilibria will not be in general
Pareto optimal since they will reflect only private (direct) effects
and not social (direct plus indirect) effects of economic activity.
Indeed, there is the well-known relation between perfectly competitive
markets for private goods, with or without lump-sum wealth redistribution,
and the Pareto efficient allocation of private goods. On this topic, this is not
the occasion to try to add to the survey chapter Hammond (2011). In the
presence of externalities or public goods, however, given any competitive
market allocation of private goods, there will usually be Pareto superior
reallocations of private goods and externalities together. Thus, even perfect
markets for private goods achieve at best a constrained notion of Pareto
efficiency, along the lines of Hammond (1997) or Hammond and Sempere
(2009).
2.3 Additional Markets for Externalities
It is commonly suggested that, even in the presence of externalities, un-
constrained Pareto efficiency could be achieved by creating new markets for
those externalities, with prices (positive or negative) that correspond to the
appropriate Pigou subsidy or tax. This suggestion loses much of its per-
suasive power once one realizes that, as Starrett (1972) observes, negative
externalities typically give rise to “fundamental non-convexities”, which pre-
vent existence of competitive equilibrium in a system of markets that allows
externalities to be priced.
Nevertheless, the suggestion leads one to realize that the distinction
between private goods and externalities, or public goods, really depends on
the institutions that determine which goods are traded, and which are not.
This, of course, introduces some ambiguity into the closely related definitions
presented in Section 2.1. Looked at this way, it is institutions rather than
tastes and technology that create externalities.
3 Pecuniary Externalities
3.1 Definition
In the first paragraph of his short subsection on pecuniary externalities,
Laffont (2008) wrote as follows:
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During the 1930s, a confused debate occurred between economists
on the relevance of pecuniary externalities, that is, on exter-
nalities which work through the price system. A quite general
consensus was that pecuniary externalities are irrelevant for wel-
fare economics: the fact that by increasing my consumption of
whisky I affect your welfare through the consequent increase in
price does not jeopardize the Pareto optimality of competitive
equilibria.
In the penultimate sentence of the subsection, he wrote:
When agents affect prices, they affect the welfare of the other
agents by altering their feasible consumption sets or their in-
formation structures. Pecuniary externalities matter for welfare
economics.
3.2 Limits to Gains from Liberalization
As an example of how pecuniary externalities can matter, it is worth con-
sidering gains from trade in international economics, notably the literature
inspired by the classical results due to Samuelson (1939, 1962) and Kemp
(1962). In general, moves toward freer trade are particular instances of eco-
nomic liberalization or supply side policy reforms where, given a status quo
allocation which would result in the absence of any liberalizing reform, there
are moves away toward a more extensive market system — see, for example,
Hammond and Sempere (1995).
Any such liberalizing reform typically changes the prices of goods, in-
cluding the wages of workers. Such price changes will typically make some
agents better off, and others worse off. To that extent, they are pecuniary
externalities. The early literature often applied the Kaldor–Hicks compen-
sation test, claiming that a reform would be beneficial provided the gainers
could compensate the losers in a way that would make all agents better off.
Such compensation tests are not only ethically indefensible because they do
nothing to ensure that losers actually get compensated. As Scitovsky (1941)
and Gorman (1955) pointed out, they can also be logically inconsistent —
see also Chipman’s (2008) survey. Instead of relying on any compensation
test, the real issue is whether a liberalizing reform can be made “credible” by
linking it to suitably chosen policy instruments intended to limit the damage
arising from negative pecuniary externalities — see Hammond (1993).
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3.3 No Adverse Pecuniary Externalities
In order to ensure that there are no adverse pecuniary externalities, the
classical literature on the gains from trade due to Samuelson and Kemp
largely confines itself to two special cases.
In the first of these, there is a finite collection of trading nations, in each
of which there is a single representative consumer. Moreover, the status quo
allocation is taken to be autarkic, without any international trade. This
ensures that whatever equilibrium prices result from free international trade
in world markets, there can be no deterioration in any country’s terms of
trade. So no nation’s representative consumer can be made worse off by
trade; moreover, except in the special case when the status quo allocation is
already Pareto efficient, at least one nation’s representative consumer will
be strictly better off.
The second special case occurs when a single nation with just one repre-
sentative consumer is a “small country”, in the technical sense that its trade
policy has no effect on prevailing world market prices. In this case there are
no pecuniary externalities at all because if the small nation liberalizes by
moving to free trade at world prices, by definition this has no effect on world
prices. So, except in the special case when the status quo is already a com-
petitive equililbrium at world prices, the small nation’s lone representative
consumer will gain.
3.4 Mitigating Pecuniary Externalities
Though negative pecuniary externalities may be inevitable outside the two
special cases just discussed, there are three particular kinds of mitigating
policy that have received attention in the theoretic literature on economic
liberalization. All of these mitigating policies work, moreover, without the
need to assume any kind of representative consumer.
Following the work of Grandmont and McFadden (1972) in particular,
the first kind of mitigating policy involves using lump-sum wealth redistri-
bution. The idea is first to compensate each consumer for any adverse price
movement, and then to share among all consumers any surplus generated
by moving to a perfectly competitive allocation. Unless the status quo is
already a Pareto efficient allocation, standard assumptions ensure that this
surplus will be positive. So the allocation after the reform, including this
redistribution, makes every consumer strictly better off provided they all
have monotone preferences.
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This kind of lump-sum redistribution, however, is typically incentive
incompatible because it encourages agents to exaggerate the minimum com-
pensation they need to ensure that they are no worse off than in the status
quo, where there has been no reform. Following the ideas of Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971) on optimal commodity taxation, Dixit and Norman (1986)
discussed a second way to mitigate price changes. This involved fixing con-
sumer prices at their status quo levels, while letting commodity tax rates
and associated producer prices adjust to clear markets. This would then
allow any surplus due to efficiency gains to be spent on a uniform lump-sum
subsidy that is the same for all individuals. For details, see for example
Hammond and Sempere (1995).
A third way of mitigating pecuniary externalities arises when the status
quo has publicly known fixed quantities, as might be the case in a command
economy such as China during the Maoist era. Such a status quo offers the
scope for “dual-track liberalization” of the kind discussed by Lau, Qian, and
Roland (1997, 2000) and by Che and Facchini (2007). The first track is the
specified status quo allocation in the command economy; the second track
is a competitive market economy. The two tracks are combined by first
insisting that each agent receives the consumption goods and also supplies
whatever is specified under the status quo. Agents, however, are also allowed
to trade freely at market prices in order to determine whatever additional
supply vector they want to offer in exchange for any additional consumption,
etc. In effect, this dual-track policy determines a particular version of the
lump-sum wealth redistribution rule considered by Grandmont and McFad-
den (1972), where each agent’s wealth endowment equals the net value at
the liberalized market prices of the fixed status quo allocation specified for
them in the command economy.
4 Institutional Externalities
4.1 Strategyproof Allocation Mechanisms
An economic environment can be defined as a collection of economic agents,
each of whom has a specified individual characteristic in the form of pref-
erences and an endowment — possibly in the form of a production set —
within a given finite dimensional commodity space. Then an allocation rule
can be defined as a mapping from a given domain of possible economic en-
vironments to a co-domain of allocations that are feasible in the relevant
environment.
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Hurwicz (1960, 1972, 1973) did much to initiate the systematic study of
such allocation rules, and the information that would be needed to reach
a satisfactory allocation — especially an allocation that is Pareto efficient
— in each relevant environment. He considered a principal or mechanism
designer who is granted the power to construct a game form or allocation
mechanism in which each agent is required to send a signal from a suitably
specified signal space, whereupon each possible profile of agents’ signals is
mapped into a feasible economic allocation. Notice that, when combined
with agents’ preferences for the economic allocation, and assuming these
take the form of an expected utility function, the game form defines a game
of incomplete information where each agent’s payoff function is replaced by
their expected utility.
A special case of particular interest is when every agent in every permis-
sible economic environment has a dominant strategy which depends only
on their own characteristic. In this case, one has a dominant strategy game
form. The almost trivial theorem 4.4.1 of Dasgupta et al. (1979) proves that,
in this case, there is an equivalent direct mechanism in which each agent’s
message is a direct signal of their individual characteristic; moreover, this
direct mechanism is strategyproof in the sense that a dominant strategy for
each agent is to announce their true characteristic.
4.2 Why Strategyproofness?
During the 1970s, Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) proved the gen-
eral impossibility of constructing a strategy-proof social decision mechanism.
Leo Hurwicz helped reinforce these negative results by considering when they
held in specific economic environments, with or without public goods. Along
with Groves and Ledyard (1977), Maskin (1999) and many others, he ini-
tiated the search for mechanisms whose Nash equilibria would yield Pareto
efficient allocations.
Implementation in Nash equilibrium, however, can be criticized on meth-
odological grounds. Let us exclude the very special case when a principal
who is designing a mechanism lacks information which is common knowl-
edge to all the agents who participate in the mechanism. Outside this case,
it would seem that the relevant game form should involve incomplete infor-
mation, thus suggesting Bayesian Nash equilibrium as a solution concept.
Furthermore, it follows from Theorem 5.1 of Dasgupta et al. (1979) that, if a
mechanism is not strategy-proof, then the outcome it generates will be sen-
sitive to agents’ beliefs about each other — see also Ledyard (1978). Hence,
except in rare cases, a mechanism that is implemented in Nash equilibrium
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rather than in dominant strategies generates allocations that depend not
just on agents’ tastes and endowments, but also on their beliefs. These be-
liefs, moreover, concern not just other agents’ tastes and endowments, but
also their beliefs about how these other agents will play the game form.
4.3 Strategyproof Exchange: When Is It Possible?
For the case of an exchange economy with two individuals, Hurwicz (1972)
proved that any strategyproof allocation rule yielding Pareto efficient out-
comes must be dictatorial. Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) explored
the difficulties in extending this result beyond two individuals. Serizawa
(2002), along with Serizawa and Weymark (2003), showed that, even if they
do not have to be dictatorial, nonetheless Pareto efficient strategyproof rules
always involve allocations that are close to being extreme — i.e., close to dic-
tatorial. Finally, Barbera` and Jackson (1995) characterized strategyproof-
ness in general exchange economies with finite numbers of agents and goods,
and showed how limited they must be even if one does not insist on Pareto
efficient outcomes.
Even so, there are some particular economic environments where strat-
egyproof exchange is possible. Apart from trivial cases, these environments
have the key property that changes in agents’ characteristics have no influ-
ence on the competitive equilibrium price, at least if the changes are small.
It follows that institutional externalities are merely endemic, rather than
universal.
4.4 Strategyproof Mechanism 1: An Islands Model
The first example is a static microeconomic version of the islands model,
which is well known to macroeconomists following the work of Lucas (1972).
There is a finite set of islands, each with a lone representative consumer.
There is no possibility of trade between the islands, so each island has its
own distinct commodity space of located goods specific to that island. Nor
are the preferences or welfare of the representative consumer in any one
island affected at all by the allocation in any other island. In this case,
an obvious mechanism is to select an isolated optimal allocation separately
within each island. This mechanism is clearly strategyproof because no
agent’s incentives are affected at all by the allocation that is chosen in any
other island.
This example shows that the institutional externality that prevents strat-
egyproof exchange can be ascribed to the resource balance constraints that
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arise in a general exchange ecoomy. In the special case of the islands model,
agents are so separated that these constraints have force only within each
island, so strategyproofness is possible.
4.5 Strategyproof Mechanism 2: Local Independence
The first case where the independence property mentioned in Section 4.3
holds, at least locally, is discussed by Makowski, Ostroy and Segal (1999).
They assume that at least one agent has a flat indifference surface in some
neighbourhood of a Walrasian equilibrium allocation. While the economy
has a Walrasian equilibrium allocation which remains in this neighbourhood,
price ratios in this particular equilibrium are determined by the normal
to this flat surface. Provided that this is the equilibrium chosen by the
mechanism, individual agents cannot manipulate prices except by distorting
their desired trades so much that they become worse off.
Section 7.5.2 of Hammond (2011) describes a second case of local inde-
pendence, which holds if there is a linear technology. A particular example
is when the “non-substitution theorem” holds. In its simplest form, this the-
orem relies on the assumptions that the economy’s production possibilities
are described by a finite collection of activities exhibiting constant returns
to scale, a single common primary factor of production, and no joint produc-
tion. These assumptions imply that equilibrium prices are independent of
demand as long as demand does not change so much as to alter the pattern
of goods that are inputs and goods that are outputs in any activity.
4.6 Strategyproof Mechanism 3: Infinitely Many Agents
The main case when strategyproof exchange is possible, however, is when
there are infinitely many agents. As acknowledged in Hammond (1979), it
was Hurwicz (1972) himself who observed that the competitive mechanism
is incentive compatible in a large economy. Sections 14 and 15 of Hammond
(2011) are devoted to a survey of the results that hold in such environments.
There is a broad class of environments in which strategyproof exchange
is possible, even in the presence of tax mechanisms such as those studied
in Guesnerie (1995). Since that survey was written, the paper Hammond
(2017) has appeared. It considers the complications involved in devising
mechanisms that remain strategyproof even when not only are agents pri-
vately informed of their endowments, but also any contracts to supply goods
fail to be self-enforcing.
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5 Concluding Remarks
The first part of this paper focused on both classical and pecuniary exter-
nalities, emphasizing their links to institutional features of the economic
system in which they arise. Later, the paper went on to explore some impli-
cations of viewing any institution that is modelled by a game form that is
not strategy-proof as giving rise to institutional externalities. Specifically, as
with both classical and pecuniary externalities, they arise when an agent’s
choice of action in the game form affects other agents’ incentives.
Leo Hurwicz’s early work on the difficulties of constructing strategy-
proof mechanisms shows that institutional externalities, understood in this
way, are endemic. The paper also explores a few very special cases where
there will be no institutional externalities. Typically, these involve purely
static economic environments with only private goods and: either many
economic agents, as Hurwicz (1972) himself had suggested; or other special
environments where no individual agent has an influence over prices, such
as when the non-substitution theorem holds.
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